OAR 165-007-0450: Risk Limiting Audit Provisions

(1) The purpose of this rule is to establish a procedure for the conduct of risk limiting audits of selected ballots following an election conducted in this state pursuant to ORS 254.532.The Secretary of State, as the chief elections officer for the State of Oregon, has the responsibility to adopt rules that the Secretary considers necessary to facilitate and assist in achieving a maximum degree of correctness, impartiality and efficiency in administration of the election laws. This rule is intended to carry out that responsibility by providing an additional mechanism for selective recounts to confirm the accuracy of the automated vote tally systems used to count ballots. (2) The “risk limit” required by ORS 254.532(6)(a) is 0.10%. (3) In order to ensure that no change or error in technology used to assist with the audit could result in an undetected change in the results of the audit, a county elections official may only choose to utilize risk limiting audit software that has been examined by a federally accredited voting systems testing laboratory (VSTL), and certified by the Secretary of State. The Secretary will review the laboratory report and procedures for the specific risk limiting audit software and then issue a decision on whether to certify the risk limiting audit software not later than 30 days after an application is received in the Elections Division from a county. (4) Upon completion of the audit, and not later than the date the county certifies the results of the election to the Secretary of State, the county elections official shall publicly report on the results of the audit. (5) The procedures described in this rule may be implemented only if a county is not required to conduct either an automatic recount under ORS 258.280 and ORS 258.290 or a partial or full demand recount under ORS 258.161. In the event that a recount under these statutes is commenced, any risk limiting audit is automatically terminated.